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Sameness, Denition, and Essence
Michail Peramatzis
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
I formulate an apparent inconsistency between some claims Aristotle makes in his
Metaphysics about the sameness and non-sameness relations which obtain between
an object and its essence: while a (type of) object is not the same as its essence,
an essence is thought as being the same as its essence. I discuss dierent ways in
which onemay propose to overcome this apparent inconsistency and show that they
are problematic. My diagnosis of the problem is that all these putative solutions
share the assumption that Aristotle is operating exclusively with the notion of strict
numerical identity between an object and its essence, or between deniendum and
deniens. I introduce the notion of sameness in nature which holds between an
object and its essence, understood as the metaphysical counterpart to the relation
of ‘being dened as’: two items are the same in nature just in case the answer to
the ‘what is it?’ or ‘what is its nature/essence?’ question is common to both. I
argue that the notions of sameness in nature and ‘being dened as’ need not (but
may) entail strict identity. Further, they are compatible with, indeed require, the
idea that an essence is prior to its essence-bearer, or that a deniens is prior to the
relevant deniendum. I conclude that the twin notions of sameness in nature and
‘being dened as’ successfully defuse the apparent inconsistency formulated at the
outset.
Keywords: essence, denition, identity, sameness, priority
1. Introduction:e Problem
InMetaphysics Z.10–11 and H.3 Aristotle makes two important claims about
the relation between a (type of) thing and its essence:
(T1) But the parts of the account are those of the form alone, while the account
is of the universal; for being circle and circle, and being soul and soul are
the same (Met. Z.10, 1035b33–1036a2).
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(T2) And [it has also been discussed that] the essence and each thing in some
cases are the same, just as in the case of primary substances, as, for in-
stance, curvature and being curvature, if this is a primary substance . . .
while in the case of those items that are as matter or are taken together
with matter, they are not the same [as their essence] nor are they acciden-
tally one [with their essence], as, for instance, Socrates and the cultivated
thing; for these last are the same accidentally (Met. Z.11, 1037a33–b7).
(T3) For soul and being soul are the same, while being man and man are not
the same, unless even the soul will be said to be a man; but this is so only
in one respect but not in another (Met. H.3, 1043b2–4).
us, in (T1), at Z.10, 1036a1–2, he seems to claim that
(A/e?) soul and being a soul (a soul’s essence) are the same (tau-
ton).
(A/e?) circle and being a circle (a circle’s essence) are the same.
In (T2), at Z.11, 1037a33–b5, it is claimed that in the case of primary sub-
stances (presumably essences or forms) each (type of) item and its essence
are the same. For instance:
(A/e?) curvature and being a curvature (a curvature’s essence)
are the same.
In the case of “material” or “matter-involving” items, by contrast, each (type
of) thing and its essence are not the same: a hylomorphic compound and its
essence is such a case. For example:
Socrates and being Socrates (Socrates’ essence) are not the same.
And in (T3), at H.3, 1043b2–4, Aristotle oers an example similar to that
used in Z.10:
(A/e?) soul and being a soul (a soul’s essence) are the same.
(A/e?) human and being a human (a human’s essence) are not
the same.
e reason he provides to support this last claim is that a (the?) soul is not
(a?) human.
ere is a way in which to generate an apparently inconsistent set of
claims fromAristotle’s remarks. Let us, for present purposes, limit the scope
of the expression ‘(type of) thing’ to what Aristotle calls “universal com-
pounds” at Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b27–30. ese are substance-kinds, types
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of object or type-objects (e.g., species) such as human or horse. Aristotle ar-
gues that they are not (primary?) substances but are constituted from form
and matter taken universally. Further, let us employ as an example of such
a substance-kind the type human.1 As an example which typies the case
of a soul invoked at Z.10, 1036a1–2, a paradigmatic case of essence or form,
we could use the essence or form being a human (or, equivalently: to be a
human; what-it-is-to-be a human). e passages just quoted would suggest
that, while the type human is not the same as its essence, being a human:
(1) Human ≠ being a human,
the essence or form being a human is the same as its essence. Suppose, for
example, that the essence of being a human is being a rational soul:
(2) Being a human = being a rational soul.
At Metaphysics Z.10, 1035b33–1036a1, as well as Z.11, 1036a28–29, this last
claim is linked with the primary role of essence or form in denition: “def-
inition is of the form (and the universal)”. Let us, for the sake of argument,
assume that this remark at least allows that essences or forms are denable.2
Hence:
(3) Being a human =de f being a rational soul.3
I take the symbol ‘=de f ’ to be signifying the relation of being dened as. If this
is correct, the context of (T1) and (T2) suggests that sameness (understood
as identity, in the manner of (2)) entails a denitional relation such as that
1 I shall return to particular compounds, individual objects, and the relation to their essence
in section 10.
2 I shall take up this important point in section 4.
3 Claims (2) and (3) raise the important question of whether an essence or form itself has
an essence or form, or whether it is itself denable (as opposed to merely being what does
the dening). ere are two related worries in this connection. First, (2) and (3) might
be thought as giving rise to the absurd idea that there is an essence of an essence, a form
of a form, or a denition of a denition. Second, this idea seems vulnerable to an innite
regress: if the essence of the essence being a human is being a rational soul, then why
not think that there is an essence of the essence being a rational soul? But if so, why not
proceed in a similar manner ad innitum? One way in which to resolve this diculty is to
exercise caution in understanding phrases such as ‘the essence of an essence’ or ‘an essence
has its essence’ etc.e italicised terms in such phrases are to be construedmetaphorically.
ey do not have the same meaning as the claims expressing the relation between (types
of) objects, the standard essence-bearers, and their essences. An essence does not have an
essence in the way in which a (type of) object has an essence which is distinguishable from,
and metaphysically prior to, it. Rather an essence “has” an essence in that it is (identical
with) an essence.is strong identity claim blocks the innite regress worry.is question
will be taken up in section 4.
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in (3).4 But the entailment seems to run in the opposite direction too: for if
x is dened as being F, it follows that x is somehow the same as being F. If
this sameness relation is understood as identity, (3) would also entail (2).
At the same time, however, Aristotle holds that substance-compounds
are denable (see, e.g., Met. Z.4, 1030a11–14: genous eide¯; Z.11, 1037a28–
29; Z.12, 1037b10–13; 1038a28–32; Z.17, 1041a20–21; 26–27; 32–b7; and else-
where).5 With the restriction to substance-kinds or type-objects in place,
this suggests that:
(4) Human =de f being a human.6
Given the mutual entailment between denitional and sameness relations
just discussed, (4) would imply:
(5) Human = being a human.
is last claim, though, clashes with (1). Alternatively, it may be thought that
a denitional relation such as that codied in claims (3) and (4) does not
entail sameness or identity. Indeed, a stronger claim might be made: deni-
tions such as (3) or (4) entail a non-identity relation between thedeniendum
and the deniens. But if this is correct, from (3) it would follow that:
(6) Being a human ≠ being a rational soul.
In this case, though, there is an inconsistency between (6) and (2).e ques-
tion I shall address in what follows is what (if any) would be the (exegetically
4 In section 8 I shall argue that themost promising way in which to resolve the inconsistency
described in the present section is by revising the sameness and the denitional relations
so that they do not entail identity.
5 My references to Metaphysics Z.17 might be thought as falling short of showing that
substance-kinds such as human are denable. For, it might be argued, in that chapter
Aristotle does not focus on the question of what a human is but of why a human is thus-
and-so, or why a certain structure belongs to (human) esh, bones, etc. If so, he raises
only certain causal-explanatory but not any denitional questions about substance-kinds.
is objection is not sensitive to Aristotle’s project in Metaphysics Z.17. In this chapter he
seeks to extend the Analytics model of explanation and denition of process-types (such
as thunder or eclipse) to substance-kinds.is model relies on the thesis that explanation
and denition are interdependent, for the causal structure of a phenomenon and its nature
or essence are interdependent. Indeed, atMet. Z.17, 1041a27–32, he argues that the essence
of a house or a human (what is picked up by a deniens-expression) is the cause of these
kinds (or: the cause of these kinds’ being what they are). Hence, the question ‘why is a hu-
man thus-and-so?’ as well as the answer to it are intrinsically linked to the question ‘what
is the kind human?’. If so, Aristotle takes such substance-kinds as denable.
6 ere is no need, for present purposes, to discuss whether, in Aristotle’s view, a substance-
kind is dened per genus et dierentiam, or in terms of form and matter, or on the basis of
potentiality and actuality, orwhat have you. For simplicity, I shall use only the hylomorphic
model.
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and philosophically) most plausible way in which Aristotle could overcome
this (apparent?) inconsistency.
2. Denying (1)
Apart from the obvious exegetical cost, denying that a substance-kind or
type-object is non-identical with its essence has a serious conceptual impli-
cation if indeed this denial is equivalent to the idea that a substance-kind, or
generally an essence-bearer, is identical with its essence. First, it would be
odd to identify the compound whole with one of its proper parts (its essence
or form). It seemsmore reasonable, then, to hold that the compound is non-
identical with its essence.7 More importantly, our intuition is that an essence
is metaphysically prior to its essence-bearer in that it makes the latter what
it is but not conversely. But if the relation between an essence-bearer and its
essence were identity, this intuition would have to be given up.8 For identity
is a symmetric relation, while priority is asymmetric, and no relation can
be both symmetric and asymmetric (in the very same way or sense). It is,
therefore, important to retain (1) as it allows for (but is not equivalent to) the
priority of essence over the relevant essence-bearer.
3. Denying (2)
One might hold that an essence or form such as being a human is not the
same as its essence, being a rational soul, just as in (1) a substance-kind or
object-type is not the same as its essence. is approach, however, is not
sensitive toAristotle’s way of distinguishing between essence and compound
in (1) and (2): in it the essence or form turns out to be dierent from its
essence, just as the compound is dierent from its essence. But if so, we
seem to be at a loss as towhat the dierence is between essence (or form) and
compound in respect of their relation to their respective essences. Further,
this option would not be a plausible way in which to formulate Aristotle’s
claim that the soul, a par excellence case of essence or form, is the same as
being a soul (Z.10, 1036a1–2).
Alternatively, one could argue that some but not all cases of essence or
form are the same as their essence. It would be dicult, though, to pro-
vide a criterion with which to determine which cases of form comply with
7 I am indebted to Riin Sirkel for this point.
8 is intuition need not inuence our view of (2). For, as noted earlier (in footnote 3),
an essence or form (as understood in the present study) does not have an essence in the
way in which a (compound) object or a kind does: being a rational soul is not an extra,
metaphysically prior entity had or possessed by being a human; rather being a rational soul
just is (identical with) the relevant essence, being a human. I shall return to this point in
section 4.
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(2) and which do not. One suggestion (perhaps motivated by Aristotle’s re-
marks about being a circle and being a curvature at Z.10, 1036a1–2, and Z.11,
1037b2–3) might be that a mathematical essence or form is the same as its
essence, whereas a natural essence or form is not. But why should this be
the case? And even if it is, how are we to understand Aristotle’s claim that
the soul (which is not a mathematical but is a natural form; see Met. E.1,
1026a1–6) and its own essence, being a soul, are the same?
Irrespective of Aristotle’s view, however, it seems correct to think that an
essence or form just is (identical with) an essence, “its” essence or the essence
it “has”, that is to say the essence that it simply is. ere is no need, indeed
it would be mistaken, to think that this requires the presence of two distinct
entities, an essence-bearer plus a metaphysically more fundamental essence
had by it. Rather, there is just one entity, an essence or form such as being
a human, expressed in two dierent ways: a shorter, perhaps more opaque
way, being a human, and a more elaborate, perhaps more perspicuous or
informative way, being a rational soul. ere is good reason, then, to hold
rm to (2).
4. Denying (3)
Another strategywould be to deny that an essence or form is denable or/and
that it has an essence. Similarly, one could maintain that while an essence
or form is denable, it is not denable in terms of its essence as it lacks an
essence.us, for instance, one could provide necessary and sucient con-
ditions for being a human, perhaps using an expression which is necessarily
co-extensive with ‘being a human’, and so somehow “dene” being a human.
One could not, however, oer a denition in terms of any essence of the en-
tity being a human: for being a human just is not the sort of entity that has
an essence. is approach relies on a deationary view of denition, one
which does not require that a correct deniens be an account of the denien-
dum’s essence. But Aristotle’s view of denition is more demanding than
this. It presupposes that a correct denition is an account of the denien-
dum’s essence (a logos te¯s ousias or tou ti e¯n einai; see, for example,Met. Z.4,
1029b20; 25–27; 1030a6–7). For, in his view, a denition describes precisely
what makes the deniendum what it is, i.e. its very essence or nature (see
Met. Z.4, 1030a3–6: hoper tode ti; cf. APo I.4, 73b7–8; I.19, 81b25–29; I.22,
83a24–32: hoper ekeino ti).
e underlying assumption shared by the dierent variants of the ap-
proach under discussion is that there is something paradoxical about the
idea that an essence has an essence, or that a form has a form, or that a
denition (which ultimately picks up an essence or form) has a denition.
Moreover, this idea seems to give rise to an innite regress. If an essence,
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such as being a human, has an essence of its own, such as being a rational
soul, there is nothing which prevents us from seeking a further essence, to
be had by being a rational soul, and so on and so forth ad innitum. Simi-
larly, if there are ‘essences of essences’, and a denition describes an essence
in its deniens, it would be possible to extend the denitional task innitely:
for there would be a further deniens describing the essence of the essence
picked up by the rst deniens, and so on and so forth ad innitum.
ese are not insurmountable diculties for (3). As I noted en pas-
sant earlier, these diculties presuppose that the essence on the right-hand
side of (2), also picked up by the deniens-phrase in (3), “belongs to” or “is
had by” the essence on the le-hand side of (2), the referent of the denien-
dum-term in (3), in the very same way in which a (type of) object, a typical
essence-bearer, has an essence in (1), the essence picked up by the deniens-
expression in (4).is is not a compelling presupposition. It seems straight-
forward to think that ‘to have’ in the phrase ‘has an essence’ and the posses-
sive case in phrases such as ‘the essence of the essence’ are used non-literally
when applied to essences themselves. ese phrases do not indicate that
there is an extra, metaphysically distinct, and more basic entity which is
somehow possessed by an essence as its “further” essence, andwhich is prior
to it or makes it what it is. Rather, the idea is that an essence, such as being
a human, just is the essence being a rational soul: for it is strictly identical
with it. is move seems to defuse the twin worries about “the essence of
an essence” and the innite regress of essence, form, and denition. In what
follows, I shall use the odd phrase ‘essence of an essence’ as sparingly as pos-
sible.is expression should not, at any rate, be understood as introducing
a further, prior entity to be had by an essence. Rather, it picks up the very
same essence itself, for instance, being a human, cast in a more elaborate or
perspicuous fashion, for example, as being a rational soul.9
Aristotle himself seems to favour some version of (3). For, atMetaphysics
Z.10, 1035b33–1036a1, and Z.11, 1036a28–29, he maintains that denition is
“of the form and of the universal”.ere are several questions raised by this
pivotal but obscure remark. Does this claim suggest that denition is of the
form (and the universal) alone or predominantly? Further, does it entail that
the only (or primary) object of denition (the only or primary legitimate
deniendum) is the essence or form, or is the restriction intended to ap-
9 Lowe (2008, 34) too argues that an essence does not have an essence as it is not an entity;
see also (Shalkowski 2008) for comments on Lowe’s paper. I agree with Lowe’s claim, if by
‘entity’ he means ‘object’ or ‘particular object’. I think, however, that essences (at least in
Aristotle’s view) are real, and so ‘entities’ in a way dierent from that in which particular
objects are entities. is does not, in any way, require that Aristotelian essences turn out
to be independently existing entities or quasi-Platonist Forms. I am indebted to Tuomas
Tahko for drawing my attention to Lowe’s view.
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ply to the deniens, what exclusively or primarily does the dening? Or is
Aristotle’s view some type of coherent combination or compromise between
some of the alternatives just adumbrated?
ere is evidence that Aristotle does not take essence or form as the only
or even primary deniendum. For he takes compounds and matter as def-
initionally posterior to essence and form (Z.10, 1035b4–22). Since he spells
out denitional posteriority as the asymmetric relation in which an item is
dened in terms of another but not conversely (Z.10, 1034b30–31; 1035b4–
11; M.2, 1077b3–4), he must think that compounds and matter are somehow
denable in terms of essence and form but not conversely. If this is correct,
there are other items, besides essence and form, which are possible objects
of denition: compounds and matter.
It seems more plausible, then, to think that essence or form is the ulti-
mate or fundamental deniens in terms of which other items (such as com-
pounds or matter) are dened.is need not imply anything stronger than
the claim that a denition is fundamentally shaped in terms of an essence
or form picked up by the deniens. Does this preclude out of hand that an
essence or form is itself a possible deniendum, such that it cannot be on
the le-hand side of claims such as (3)? Not necessarily. AtMetaphysicsH.3,
1043a29–36, Aristotle contends that terms such as ‘house’ or ‘animal’ may
signify not the compound but the essence, form, or actuality. For instance,
‘human’ may signify the same as ‘being a human’ in our (2). At the same
time, though, he claims that the essence or form of a house is to be a shelter,
and the essence or form of a (human) animal is to be a (human or rational)
soul. is suggests that an essence or form can be further dened in the
manner of our (3): human, understood as the essence being a human, can
be further “unpacked” in a denition in terms of (e.g.) being a rational soul.
is is the intuition underlying (3).is denitional claim is legitimate,
for an essence such as being a human can be set out in terms of a more
elaborate or more illuminating account, such as (e.g.) being a rational soul.
is deniens does not pick up any additional entity, a distinct essencewhich
is prior to being a human. Rather, it picks up the very same entity, the essence
being a human, perhaps expressed in an epistemically more transparent or
intelligible fashion. us, while being a human = being a rational soul, the
denition in terms of being a rational soul seems unproblematic provided
that what is picked up by the deniens-expression is not a distinct or prior
entity but simply the same essence, described in an epistemically more basic
guise.
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5. Denying (4)
Another attempt at resolving the inconsistency would be to deny that com-
pounds (substance-kinds, type-objects, or generally essence-bearers) are de-
nable. is desperate approach might be motivated by Aristotle’s cryptic
claim that particular compounds, objects such as Socrates or Bucephalus,
are not denable (or indeed knowable; Z.10, 1036a2–9; Z.11, 1037a25–30;
Z.15, 1039b27–1040a7). A proponent of this approach might think that this
claim carries over to universal compounds too, such as the substance-kind
human in (1) and (4). A more cautious reading of the relevant passages,
however, not only suggests that universal compounds or substance-kinds
are paradigmatic objects of denition (occupying the deniendum position;
see, e.g., Met. Z.4, 1030a11–14: genous eide¯; Z.11, 1037a28–29; Z.12, 1037b10–
13; 1038a28–32; Z.17, 1041a20–21; 26–27; 32–b7; and elsewhere). It even allows
that particular compoundsmay be denable in a certain way: in terms of the
essence or form of the substance-kind they are members of (Z.10, 1036a7-8;
Z.11, 1037a28-30).
A more rened version of this strategy would be to claim that there is
a fundamental dierence between the sameness and denitional relations
obtaining in the case of an essence or form and those applying to substance-
kinds or type-objects. Hence, an essence or form is dened purely in terms
of its essence, or the essence it is, without any addition or subtraction of
anything. If so, a denition such as (3) does indeed march in step with a
sameness claim such as (2). For the deniens just is the deniendum in (3),
and so the identity reading of the sameness claim in (2) is correct. In the
case of a substance-kind, by contrast, the deniens in (4) adds to or subtracts
from the deniendum (as the case may be) some item, and so cannot entail,
or be entailed by, an identity claim such as (5). Rather, it allows only for
a non-identity such as (1). For in (4) the deniens is something “more” or
something “less” than the deniendum, and so no identity claim can obtain
on the basis of such a denition.
Clearly, the major question to be raised, at this juncture, is why deni-
tions of substance-kinds proceed in this fashion of addition or subtraction,
and what the nature of these denitional operations is. A suggestion might
be that an essence or form ismatter-free or purely “formal”, and so is dened
in a parallel purist fashion, without any need for adding to or subtracting
from it anything. A substance-kind, by contrast, is a type of material object
and so in dening it one has to deal with its material character. If one judges
that the relevantmatter is denitory of the type, one has to add thismatter to
the type’s essence or form and construct an inated denienswhich picks up
the type’s essence or form plus its matter. But if one thinks that this matter is
not to be mentioned in the type’s denition, one subtracts the matter from
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it, and so one produces a “light” deniens in terms of the type’s essence or
formminus its matter.
e assumption inherent in this approach is that essence and denition
do not, or need not, mirror each other. For the adding operation presup-
poses that, whereas the type-object is essentially (I take it) immaterial, its
denition has to add a reference to non-essential (but perhaps merely nec-
essary?) material items. e reason for the addition may be an underly-
ing view of denition in which a deniens-expression should mention non-
essential but merely necessary features over and above the essence or form.
e subtracting route, on the other hand, takes the type-object as essentially
material but treats its denition as an “essence/form only” aair. Perhaps
the motivation behind this is Aristotle’s claim that denition is of the form
and the universal (Z.10, 1035b33-1036a1; Z.11, 1036a28-29). Proponents of
subtraction would construe this claim as ‘denition is of the form and the
universal alone’.ey would also think that matter cannot have any formal
or universal specication. ey would, therefore, feel compelled to rescind
it from the deniens.
Aristotle’s answer to addition and subtraction would be that they simply
fail to capture the essence of the deniendum. If so, they fail to serve the
role of a successful denition: to be an account of the deniendum’s essence.
Regardless of whether we treatmatter as essential to a substance-kind or not,
if we deem anything essential to the deniendum, we have to mention it in
but not subtract it from the deniens. Similarly, if anything is non-essential
to the deniendum, it should not be added to the deniens. While Aristotle’s
argument in Metaphysics Z.4-5 is far from being straightforward, it clearly
indicates that denitions by addition or subtraction are unsuccessful as they
do not describe what the deniendum is in itself (kath’ hauto) or essentially
(to ti e¯n einai tini/touto¯i; see. Z.4, 1029b18-19; 28-1030a2; Z.5, 1030b14-28;
1031a2-11).
Conceptually, too, the idea that a denitionmirrors an essence precisely,
adding nothing non-essential or subtracting nothing essential, seems attrac-
tive. A denition which invokes non-essential items or omits essential fea-
tures fails to describe what the deniendum is precisely (see the hoper in the
hoper tode ti and hoper ekeino ti locutions at Met. Z.4, 1030a3-6; APo I.4,
73b7-8; I.22, 83a24-32). is may render a denition explanatorily inade-
quate: for it would not explain in virtue of what the deniendum is as it
is, or what makes it the type of thing it is. Or it may lead to agrant fal-
sities in which the deniendum- and deniens-expressions are plainly not
co-extensive.
It should be noted that the requirement that a deniens-phrase should
pick up that item which makes the deniendum what it is (and so an item
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which is metaphysically prior to, but not identical with, the deniendum)
need not clash with the idea that a denition implies a sameness claim.e
fact that the deniens is prior to the deniendum is compatible with a same-
ness relation between the two, provided that this sameness relation is not
strict identity. In section 8 I shall suggest a way in which to understand
Aristotelian sameness without equating it with identity.
6. Denying the Entailment from (4) to (5)
It could be argued thatwe are notwarranted to infer any sameness or identity
relation from a denition such as (4). Nor should we make any inferences
in the opposite direction: for a non-sameness claim such as (1) may well be
compatible with a denition such as (4), or indeed entail it.at is, the non-
sameness between a type-object and its essence could still allow for, or even
imply, a denition of the former in terms of the latter.e move from (4) to
(5) is not cogent.
e rst diculty with this line is that it may suggest that in the case of
(2) and (3), too, it would be incorrect to infer any sameness or identity from a
denition, or conversely. But this seems exegetically unmotivated and, at any
rate, incorrect. If the deniens of an essence or form—or any deniendum,
for that matter—is to be F, this deniendum is (in some way) the same as to
be F. e present approach could reply by distinguishing between cases in
which the entailment (or even equivalence) holds and those in which it does
not apply. Hence, for instance, it may be thought that, whereas in the case of
an essence or form denitional and sameness relations are bi-conditionally
linked, in the case of type-objects it is not the case that a denition entails a
sameness claim (or vice-versa). is reply is articial. It also lacks any tex-
tual support: Aristotle deploys the notion of sameness and non-sameness
(tauton; ou tauton) for both essences and compounds in the very same con-
text without signalling any shi in the meaning or the implications of the
term ‘tauton’.
ere is a further question, though, about what exactly the denial of the
entailment amounts to. In holding that we should not derive (5) from (4)
are we asserting simply that it is not the case that a denition entails a same-
ness claim between deniendum and deniens? Or is this denial equivalent
to a stronger claim in which a denition entails a non-sameness claim about
the deniendum and the deniens? While the former approachmay still ren-
der denitions compatible with (but not grounds for) sameness relations be-
tween the relevant deniendum and deniens, the latter, stronger view treats
denitions as straightforwardly entailing non-sameness claims such as (1).
Apart from the obvious problem raised by the plausible link between
(2) and (3), this view just seems too strong. For we would wish to retain
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the possibility that some denitions do not preclude out of hand a sameness
relation between the deniendum and the deniens. Indeed, we may argue
that all denitions at the very least allow for such a sameness relation, even if
this relation cannot be read o from them alone or automatically.us, for
example, wemay hold that, with certain conservative grammatical reformu-
lations, a denition may be transformed into a claim that strongly supports
the deniendum-deniens sameness or identity claim.
Here is an indication as to how to make these last abstract suggestions
more concrete. While one may hold rm to (1) and (4), thereby denying (5),
one may re-read (4) as follows:
(7) Human =de f the type of object whose essence is to be a human.
is seems derivable from (4). But (7) also seems to support, or at least be
compatible with, the following claim:
(8) Human = the type of object whose essence is to be a human.
For what else is the kind human if not identical with the type of object the
essence of which is to be a human (or being a human; or what-it-is-to-be a
human)? We could formalise this approach by regimenting a ‘the’ operator
which objecties or type-objecties the predicates it is pre-xed to. us,
when ‘the’ is introduced before the essence-specifying predicate ‘being a hu-
man’, it transforms it into a type-object phrase such as ‘the type of object
with the essence being a human’.e move from a denition such as (4) to
an identity such as (8) via theminimal route of the ‘the’ operator in (7) seems
innocuous and attractive. ere is no reason, therefore, to block the infer-
ence from denition to sameness (or conversely) or, worse, to assert that a
denition necessarily implies non-sameness.
7. Unilateral Revisions of Denition or Sameness
Perhaps amore principled way in which to block the implication from (4) to
(5) would be to revise the notion of denition governing (3) and (4). In this
view, a denitional relation should not be linked with sameness or identity
in any way. It does not entail, nor is it entailed by, sameness or identity.us,
(3) and (4) tell us nothing about the “identity conditions” of the deniendum
or its sameness relations to anything. It is true, as (2) states, that an essence
or form is the same as, or identical with, its own “being”. But this is not to
be derived from the denition of an essence or form. Nor does (2) point
to any denition of an essence or form along the lines of (3). e theoret-
ical grounds for this approach may consist in the idea that a denition is
a linguistic item or a mere description which at best helps knowers such as
ourselves to pick up or grasp the deniendum. is sort of epistemic role,
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however, does not reect the real nature, the identity, or the sameness re-
lations of the type-object, the real-world entity picked up or described by a
dening formula. No sameness or identity claims, then, should be read o
from any denition.
A similarly “unilateralist” approach would be to revise sameness or/and
identity in awaywhichwould divorce them fromanydenitional constraints
or implications. us, one could maintain that (1) and (2) tell us nothing
about the denitions of an essence such as being a human or a substance-
kind such as human. e motivation for this may be coming from a de-
ationary view of sameness or even identity, one which renders it virtually
equivalent to necessary co-extensiveness.e proponent of this view would
understand sameness or non-sameness claims such as (1) or (2) analogously
to examples such as the following:
e evening star = the morning star.
Human = animal capable of laughing.
Socrates = Plato’s teacher.
In all these examples of sameness or identity it would be misleading, coun-
terintuitive, or even plainly mistaken to infer any corresponding denitions.
e morning star, the evening star, or Venus would be dened in terms of
(for instance) being a planet in our solar system having a certain position,
orbit, mass, etc.e kind human would be dened not in terms of any of its
merely necessary propria such as its risibility, but in terms of (for example)
being a rational biped animal or being a rational soul. Similarly, Socrates
would be dened, arguably, as essentially a member of the human kind and
so in terms of that kind’s denition. Deriving denitions from sameness or
identity claims is an unwarranted move.
e weakness implicit in this view is that it is not sensitive to the dis-
tinctive type of sameness or identity statements that (1) or (2) constitute. In
both cases Aristotle arms or denies an item’s sameness or identity with its
own essence: a human and being a human; or soul and being a soul. He does
not put forward claims about sameness or non-sameness obtaining between
an item and whatever is picked up by a denite description of, or another
proper name for, it. Nor is he interested in an entity’s sameness or non-
sameness with one of its merely necessary peculiar features (propria). His
focus on essence and his contention that a (successful or correct) denition
is an account of the deniendum’s essence suggest that he would not dis-
associate sameness from denition in the manner suggested by our unilat-
eral revisionist. Aristotle’s non-sameness and sameness claims, (1) and (2),
are about the essence of the item in the le-hand side of the two formulae.
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An essence is what fundamentally denes those items, what is picked up
by the deniens-phrases of denitions such as (3) and (4). e two pairs of
claims, then, should mirror each other. It seems that both types of unilat-
eral revisionism—whether of denition alone, or of sameness alone—fail to
capture Aristotle’s considered position.
8. Fine-tuning Sameness and Denition
To oer a more promising solution to the apparent inconsistency noted in
the introduction it seems reasonable to start by rejecting this last strategy
of the unilateral revisionist. Aristotelian sameness (or “essence-sameness”)
and denition seem closely interwoven. If an item is essentially the same
as being F, then being F denes this item. Conversely, too, what is picked
up by a deniens-phrase is essentially the same as what is referred to by the
corresponding deniendum-term of a given denition.is, however, is just
to bite the bullet about the clash of (1)with (4) and (5): why is the kindhuman
not the same as its essence despite the fact that this kind is indeed dened
in terms of that very essence?
An assumption shared by all strategies discussed so far, indeed an as-
sumption which underlies the very formulation of our puzzle, is that Aris-
totle’s essential sameness and non-sameness claims are translatable (respec-
tively) into strict identity and non-identity statements such as (1) and (2).
Similarly, denitions such as (3) and (4) are viewed as corresponding to
sameness claims understood in terms of strict identity. But is the move from
sameness or denition to identity cogent? Is there any logical space for a
view of essential sameness and denition which is not identity-laden?
In section 2 I noted that a reason why (1) seems plausible is that the
essence being human is metaphysically prior to, and so non-identical with,
the kind human. Identifying the kind with its essence would discard this in-
tuition of asymmetry. For it would be in tensionwith the idea that an essence
makes the essence-bearer what it is, while the converse does not hold good.
But this notion ofmetaphysical priority also governs denitional claims such
as (4).10 us, the deniens being a human is metaphysically prior to the
deniendum human: for the kind’s essence, being a human, picked up by
the deniens-formula, is that in virtue of which the kind human is what it is
but not conversely. It seems that the priority of essence over essence-bearer
and the priority of deniens over deniendum are just two sides of the same
10 In section 4 I argued that metaphysical priority need not, indeed should not, apply to
claims such as (2) or (3). For in such cases we are not dealing with two distinct entities, an
object or essence-bearer plus its essence (or the essence it has) but with just one and the
same entity, an essence such as being a human, also understood as being a rational soul.
But being a human = being a rational soul.
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metaphysical coin.
is idea sets an important constraint upon our understanding of es-
sential sameness and denition. To allow for the priority of essence over
essence-bearer and of deniens over deniendum, essential sameness and
denition must not be equivalent to, or entail, identities. For, if they were
straightforwardly translatable into identities, they would become congru-
ence and equivalence relations just as identity is. us, they could not be
asymmetric and so could not meet a basic requirement for priority. is
does not imply that (1) and (2) are to be discarded altogether. (1) and (2)
may still be true but not because of any denitional or essential sameness
claims. Perhaps, they are true on independent grounds. Hence, for exam-
ple, an essence or formmay be identical with “its” essence just in virtue of the
nature of the referents of the two expressions anking the identity sign. Sim-
ilarly, a substance-kind or type-object may be non-identical with its essence
just because it is of an ontological category dierent from that of an essence.
I shall return to this point in section 9. It is important to emphasise, at any
rate, the possibility that neither essential sameness nor denition are tanta-
mount to strict identity.
In this view of essential sameness and denition, it is plausible to think
that, while identity may entail essential sameness and denition, it is not the
case that essential sameness or denition entails identity. is last claim is
not to be confused with the stronger view, which holds that essential same-
ness or denition entails non-identity. For instance, consider (2): being a
human (the essence of the kind human) is identical with “its” essence, being
a rational soul. Indeed, they are one and the same entity. is entails (3):
being a human is dened in the terms of the essence being a rational soul. It
also entails that being a human and being a rational soul are essentially the
same: for to be a human is nothing other than, or is essentially the same as,
being a rational soul. By contrast, while the essence of the kind human is
being a human, and the kind is dened in terms of being a human, it does
not follow that the kind human is identical with the essence being a human.
is suggests that some cases of essential sameness and denition allow
for identity, whereas some others do not. Being a human is essentially the
same as, and is dened in terms of, being a rational soul. But it is also the case
that being a human is identical with being a rational soul. If so, the essential
sameness and denitional relations obtaining between the two should not
rule out identity. On the other hand, the kind human is dened in terms
of being a human, and is essentially nothing other than, or is essentially the
same as, being a human: for what else is to be (a member of) this kind other
than to be a human? But it is not true, nor does it follow from those essen-
tial sameness and denitional relations that human = being a human. It is
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possible, to be sure, to use the device of the ‘the’ operator outlined in sec-
tion 6, and derive from these two relations the identity ‘human = the type
whose essence is to be a human’. But this is not the same identity statement
as ‘human = being a human’ (or so I shall argue in section 9).
It seems true that essential sameness and denition entail necessary co-
extension between the relevant terms picking up essence and essence-bearer
or deniens and deniendum. But necessary co-extension is by nomeans the
whole story about essential sameness and denition. For the relation of nec-
essary co-extension also obtains between the terms corresponding to a kind
and its propria. us, for instance, whereas all and only humans (necessar-
ily) are capable of laughing, being capable of laughing just doesn’t seem to
be the essence of the kind human. Essences are not mere propria.
To ll in the gaps of the present account of essential sameness and de-
nition it seems promising to pursue the idea discussed earlier in the present
section about being “essentially nothing other than” or “essentially the same
as”. A notational variant of this idea would be the notion of “non-dierence”
or “sameness in nature”.e concept of (essential) sameness and denition
being sought aer is one in which the answer to the ‘what is it?’ or ‘what
is its essence/nature?’ question, when asked about the two relata, is com-
mon to both.11 Being a human and being a rational soul are the very same
essence, just one entity, and so must “have” the very same nature or essence,
one ‘what-it-is’ and a common denition.e kind human and being a hu-
man do not seem to be the very same entity: they are not identical. For,
11 David Charles introduces a similar relation in his interpretation of Metaphysics Z.6. He
also argues that this relation is not to be understood in terms of (strict numerical) iden-
tity (cf. Charles 2011). e relation of sameness in nature should be distinguished from
that of likeness in nature discussed by Zylstra in the present volume (2014, sections 1.2
and 5). Likeness in nature, as Zylstra understands it, seems to obtain between particulars
which have the same nature and are essentially characterised by the same substance-kind
term.us, for instance, Socrates and Plato are alike in nature in that both are (essentially)
humans (or members of the kind human). Aristotle would normally conceive of this rela-
tion as oneness or sameness in (substance-) kind (see, e.g.,Met. B.4, 999b24–1000a4; B.6,
1002b12–32; M.10, 1086b22–27, where Aristotle contrasts oneness or sameness in number
(arithmo¯i) with oneness or sameness in kind (eidei)).ere is no incompatibility between
sameness in nature, as I understand it, and Zylstra’s likeness in nature.ere are, however,
two important dierences between the two relations. First, while sameness in nature holds
between an essence-bearer and its essence, an item which is not a member of the relevant
substance-kind, likeness in nature holds between (particular) objects which are members
of the same (substance-) kind. Second, sameness in nature presupposes that the correct
logical form of an answer to the ‘what is it?’ question is given along the lines of ‘being F’,
‘to be F’, or ‘what-it-is-to-be F’, an expression which picks up an essential way or mode of
being, an Aristotelian ti e¯n einai or essence (see section 9). Likeness in nature, by contrast,
takes the logical form of such an answer to be ‘F’ or ‘the F’, a phrase which picks up a
substance-kind, one of the secondary substances of Aristotle’s Categories.
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as I remarked earlier, being a human is prior to, and so non-identical with,
the kind human. But what-it-is-to-be the kind human and being a human
seem to be the same in essence or nature: to be the kind is essentially noth-
ing other than to be a human. Both the kind and the essence are dened in
terms of being a rational soul.is does not imply that the kind is identical
with its essence, and so is not inconsistent with (1). Nor, however, does it
rule out an identity statement along the lines of (8), with the help of the ‘the’
operator inserted in (4). For the denition of the kind human in terms of
being a human can, without any radical transformation, be recast as ‘human=de f the kind whose essence is to be a human’. But this last denition, our
(7), seems straightforwardly to yield (8): human = the kind whose essence
is to be a human.
9. Ontological Excursus
e basic ideas underlying the present view of essential sameness and de-
nition are the following two. First, the metaphysical priority of essence over
essence-bearer and of deniens over deniendum suggests that the relation
between the two items is non-identity. Second, despite this non-identity as-
pect of essential sameness and denition, the two relatamay or may not be
identical in virtue of their own nature. Or they may or may not be iden-
tical because of further, additional features they possess. At any rate, their
identity or non-identity would not be grounded on their essential sameness
or/and denitional relations as such.
Both of these crucial points give rise to the question of how to under-
stand the relata involved in essential sameness or denitional claims such as
(1)–(4). Aristotle’s ontology is populated mainly by what he calls “particu-
lar compound substances” (hylomorphic compounds) and “universal com-
pounds” (consisting of form and matter “taken universally”); matter and
material parts; essences or forms and their parts. Aristotle also holds that
an essence or form is metaphysically and denitionally prior to the relevant
(particular and universal) compounds andmatter: an essence or formmakes
these posterior items what they are (but not conversely), and so they are de-
ned in terms of it (but not conversely).
e crucial question, however, is what general ontological category an
essence or form belongs to. Clearly, this “generic” question is linked to the
corresponding generic question ofwhat ontological categories the items pos-
terior to form—the compound and matter—fall under. In the case of the
compound the answer seems simpler. e compound is an object—either
a particular or token-object (like Socrates or Bucephalus) or a universal or
type-object (like human or horse; Z.10, 1035b27–31 and .). It seems plausi-
ble to understand universal or type-objects as in some sense metaphysically
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parasitic upon particular or token-objects.
Similarly, matter—whatever it is precisely—seems to conform to this
distinction: for there are token-materials (such as these particular written or
uttered speech elements; or my own nasal matter) as well as type-materials
(such as inky or air-en speech elements; or exercised humanmuscles). Meta-
physics Z.10, 1035a9–17, oers the example of a syllable and the “material el-
ements”, the letters making it up. Further, 1035a17–b3 describes bones and
esh as the tokenmatter into which a particular compound human perishes
(see especially the example of Callias at 1035a33). Let us call objects or types
of object, entities such as compounds and matter, ‘type (a)’ entities.
Tounderstand the status of essence or form, it is helpful to return toAris-
totle’s striking identity and non-identity claims such as (1) and (2) made not
only inMetaphysics Z.10–11 and H.3 (101035b31–1036a3; 1037a33–b7; 1043b1–
4 and .) but also in Topics V.4, 133b31–36. Against the background of his
understanding of universal compounds, the non-identity should be due to
the fact that human is a universal compound, a type-object, which has an
essence or form. Further, its essence or form is prior to, and so non-identical
with, it.e soul, by contrast, is paradigmatically an essence or form and so
does not have, but is the essence or form; it is identical with “its” essence or
form.
Moreover, it is fair to note that there is a deeper dierence between
human and being a soul, or more generally between the (token or type) F
and (the essence/form) being F, in respect of logical grammar and ontology.
e former is an object (this human or Socrates) or a type-object (human),
whereas the latter is a what-it-is-to-be-F (to ti e¯n einai to¯(i) F; to einai to¯(i)
F), an essence or a form. e most promising, if unconventional, manner
in which to characterise an essence or form is as a way ormode of being for
the (token or type) F-object. Indeed, the notion of a way or mode of being
seems best to capture Aristotle’s own terminology of ‘what-it-is-to-be-F’. Let
us call ways or modes of being ‘type (b)’ entities.
Is talk of ways or modes of being excessively mysterious? Not so much,
I think. Modernmetaphysicians, such as E. J. Lowe, C. B. Martin, and J. Heil
employ this conceptual apparatus seriously and, arguably, with considerable
success. One reason why they posit ways or modes of being is that they aim
sharply to distinguish their views of properties from trope theories, in which
an object is identied with a bundle of particularised properties (or tropes).
ey insist, by contrast, that a property is simply a way in which, or how, an
object is. ere is no need for the present proposal to conceive essences or
forms strictly as particular or individual ways of being, as Martin and Heil
suggest in their account of properties (but nothing inmy view rules out there
being particular or individual ways of being). Nor is it necessary to identify,
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as Lowe does, a particular object or compound with its form. Indeed, this
is an identity that my view explicitly and strongly denies in order to respect
Aristotle’s own non-identity claims such as (1).12
An Aristotelian way of being seems to be the ontological correlate of an
open sentence such as ‘Fx’ or ‘__ is F’ or ‘F__’. As such it “cries out for sat-
uration”, to use a Fregean turn of phrase.is seems to accommodate Aris-
totle’s claim that an essence or form necessarily depends for its existence on
some particular compound or other existing (unlike implausible, Platonist
versions of essentialism). Second, this view of essence and form is sensitive
to the deep, categorial dierence that seems to obtain between type (a) and
type (b) entities. ird, a way of being as such is not to be identied with
an essence or form. e concept of a way of being is general enough to be
distinct from that of an essence. For a way of being is not sucient, by it-
self, to mark out an essence from a non-essence. Aer all, there are many
ways of being—being pale, being sun-tanned, being sun-burnt, etc.—which
may be ways for Socrates or for (members of) the human-type to be without
being essential ways of being for them. Fourth, because ways of being are
the ontological correlates of open sentences, the essentiality of a way of be-
ing can be conceived of as the real counterpart to an adverbial qualication
or copula-modier such as ‘essentially’: to be Socrates or to be (a member
of) the human kind is to be essentially human. Fih, this view also allows
for Aristotelian notions such as potentiality or actuality to be the real-world
parallels to corresponding copula-modiers such as ‘potentially/actually’, ‘in
potentiality/actuality’, or ‘in respect of potential/actual being’. us, for in-
stance, to be the matter of a house—the house-buildable bricks, stones, and
mortar—is to be potentially a house. Or to be an actual house, one that exem-
plies the form and the nal cause of being a house, is for the bricks, stones,
andmortar to be actually arranged as a covering for the sake of protection of
humans and their belongings fromwind, heat, and rain (or something along
these lines).
Most importantly, though, this view respects our intuition that an
essence or form is ontologically prior to the items it is the essence or form
of: for it makes the latter what they are but not conversely.is asymmetric
relation of priority cannot be preserved by views which identify a token- or
type-object with its essence or form. For, as pointed out earlier, this sort of
12 Lowe does not understand essences or forms, but only particular properties, as modes of
being. Rather, he identies essences or formswith sortals, substance-kinds, such as human
or horse—Aristotle’s secondary substances in the Categories. In this respect he distances
himself from the Aristotelian view I am defending at present. See (Lowe 2013), (Lowe
2012b) and (Lowe 2012a). For his identication of formwith the compound also see (Lowe
1999).
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identity (a congruence and equivalence relation) would be symmetric, while
the ontological priority relation is asymmetric, and no relation can be both
symmetric and asymmetric (in the same way or sense).13 Understanding
essence or form as a way of being emphasises at the outset the categorial
distinctness and so the non-identity between a form and the corresponding
compound. If so, it accommodates (or at least does not disregard) the intu-
itive idea that an essence or form is ontologically prior to (but not identical
with) the token- or type-object it is the essence or form of. Needless to say,
this result is in agreement with Aristotle’s non-identity claims such as (1).
e aimof the present ontological digression is to clarify Aristotle’s iden-
tity and non-identity claims (1) and (2) without giving up the denitional
and essential sameness relations between a type (a) entity and its essence,
the relevant type (b) entity. From the discussion of type (b) entities it seems
clear that an essence such as being a human is identical with “its” essence,
being a rational soul, in terms of which it is also dened: both the identity
and the denitional claims, (2) and (3), are about just one entity, an essence
or (essential) way of being.is is not to deny that being a human and being
a rational soul are the same “in essence” or “in nature”. Nor is it to give up
the intuition that being a human is dened in terms of being a rational soul.
Indeed, this is a case in which essential sameness and denition straightfor-
wardly allow for identity.
In the case of the kind human and its essence, being a human, by con-
trast, (1) holds good because of the fundamental categorial and ontological
diversity between type (a) and type (b) entities.e former is a kind, a type-
object, whereas the latter is an essence, an (essential) way or mode of being:
how could they ever be identical? At the same time, though, (4) is correct:
the kind human is dened in terms of its essence. is is equivalent to a
claim of essential sameness between the two: for to be the kind is essentially
nothing other than, or is the same in nature as, to be a human. By nomeans,
however, is this sameness in nature or in essence equivalent to, or sucient
for, identity.14 To generate a corresponding identity claim, one would have
13 For example, one might argue that while a (type of) object and its essence are identical, yet
the essence is prior to the (type of) object in an epistemic way or sense in that it makes the
(type of) object knowable or better known to us.is line of argument, however, involves
a shi from an ontological sense of identity to an epistemic sense of priority.
14 Hence, the present claim of essential sameness need not clashwith Aristotle’s own repeated
claims in the Topics V.4, 133b31–6, and Sophistici Elenchi 24, 179a35–b1, that the F type
of thing and being F, although the same, dier in being (einai) or in substance/essence
(ousia). Nor is it necessary, because of these claims, to understand the relation between
a (type of) thing and its essence as merely necessary co-extension between the respective
terms. Rather, the idea is that the F type of thing diers “in being” or “in substance” from
being F as the former is a type of object, while the latter is an essential way of being.ey
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to use the device of the ‘the’ operator within (4) and derive something like
‘human = the kind whose essence is to be a human’.is result also indicates
that essential sameness and denition do not rule out certain related identity
claims.
10. Particular Compounds and their Essence
Some modern metaphysicians nd it dicult to appreciate the Aristotelian
concern with what I have labelled ‘type-objects’, ‘substance-kinds’, or ‘uni-
versal hylomorphic compounds’ and the relation to their essence. ey are
primarily interested in, or even obsessed with, particular hylomorphic com-
pounds, token-objects, such as Socrates or Bucephalus. It would be useful,
then, to close our study bymaking some brief remarks about whether, and if
so, how the present view applies to the relation between particular objects,
such as Socrates, and their essence.
It seems that in the case of Socrates a non-identity claim analogous to
(1) is more straightforwardly true:
(9) Socrates ≠ being a human.15
For, arguably, particular compounds such as Socrates just are not identi-
cal with their essences as the former are token-objects, whereas the latter
are (essential) ways of being for these token-objects. Indeed, in the places
where Aristotle puts forward (1) it seems plausible to interpret him as refer-
ring predominantly to the relation between particular compounds and their
essences.is is not to deny that his remarks also apply to substance-kinds.
Hence, in (T1) he contrasts the cases of (a/the?) circle and (a/the?) soul
with intelligible or perceptible particular compounds (Z.10, 1036a1–3: kath’
hekasta). In (T2) the identity of (a/the?) curvature and being a curvature
is introduced immediately aer discussing the examples of Callias and (this
concrete particular) snub-nose (Z.11, 1037a33.). Further, again in (T2), the
non-identity of a compound and its essence seems to be exemplied by the
case of Socrates (or things like him) and his essence.16 Similarly, the non-
identity claimmade in (T3) seems to be ultimately grounded on the idea that
are the same, however, in the following two respects: (a) necessarily, the very same items
are members of the type F and are instances of the way of being F (i.e., the corresponding
terms are necessarily co-extensive); and (b) being F is the essential way of being for the F
type of thing.
15 Abasic question, at this juncture, is how to understand Socrates’ essence, or being Socrates.
I shall proceed on the assumption that particular substance compounds are essentially
members of their corresponding substance-kinds, and so have the same essence as these
kinds: being Socrates is simply to be a human.
16 Ross (1924) and Jaeger (1957) emend this dicult sentence atMet. Z.11, 1037b5, into oud’ ei
kata sumbebe¯kos hen. Ross (1924, 205) reads this as follows: “Nor is a thing the same as its
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an essence or a form such as being a human or being a (rational) soul—an
(essential) way of being—is not a (concrete particular?) human being (H.3,
101043b2–4).
It is not necessary, however, to deny the possibility of dening particu-
lar compounds in some way comparable with (4). Socrates himself may be
denable (perhaps in some attenuated notion of denability?) in terms of
the essence or form of human, the substance-kind he is a member of (see
Z.10, 1036a7–9: all’ aei legontai kai gno¯rizontai to¯(i) katholou logo¯(i); Z.11,
1037a25–29: te¯s sunole¯s, taute¯s de g’ esti po¯s logos kai ouk estin . . . kata te¯n
pro¯te¯n d’ ousian estin, hoion anthro¯pou ho te¯s psuche¯s logos). For instance:
(10) Socrates =de f being a human (or being a rational soul).
It may even be the case that the kind’s essence or form essentially involves
matter of some appropriate sort.us, for example, being a human is being
a rational soul. But being a human or being a rational soulmay be essentially
unspeciable without a reference to (e.g.) being a body with tissues, bones,
esh, etc. structured in a certain fashion.17 Irrespective of our approach to
this last question of whether essences or forms are pure or essentiallymatter-
involving, it seems clear that Socrates himself involves types of matter and
material parts which are not essential to him. Perhaps these types of mat-
ter or material part belong to him only necessarily or even merely acciden-
tally. It is necessary that Socrates have an epidermis with some complex-
ion or other. But this is hardly one of his (or his kind’s) essential features.
Or Socrates is now having a sun-burnt nose. But this is only an accidental
and ephemeral feature he has because he spent too much time philosophis-
essence if the thing be a compound of a subject with an accidental attribute”. It is unclear
how this sense can be extracted from the Greek. It also seems out of place for Aristotle
to focus on the relation between a hylomorphic compound and an accidental compound
consisting of it plus a non-substance attribute. e manuscript reading seems to make
better sense as it stands: oude kata sumbebe¯kos hen. Socrates is neither identical with his
essence (contrast how an essence or form is identical with “its” essence) nor coincidentally
the same as it (contrast how Socrates is the same as the cultivated Socrates). e crucial
connective oude can be read in two rather diverse ways. First: a particular compound is
neither identical with its essence nor even coincidentally the same as it. In this construal,
the relation between Socrates and his essence is lesser or weaker even than coincidental
identity.is seems unattractive. It is more promising to adopt the second reading: a par-
ticular compound is neither identical with its essence normerely coincidentally the same as
it.us, Socrates is not identical with being a human. But nor is he merely coincidentally
the same as being a human. Rather, there is an intermediate type of sameness, weaker than
identity but stronger than coincidental sameness, which obtains in the case of Socrates and
his essence.is would be our notion of essential sameness or/and denition.
17 For a view of natural essences or forms as essentially matter-involving see (Peramatzis
2011), (Peramatzis 2014) and (Peramatzis n.d.).
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ing in the scorching Athenian sun yesterday. It is the presence of these ex-
tra, non-essential features which render Socrates non-identical with his (or
his kind’s) essence or form. For this essence just could not include any of
Socrates’ merely necessary or accidental features, whereas Socrates himself
does indeed possess such features.
ere are three important questions growing out of this view of particu-
lar compounds or token-objects. First, what is the relation between Socrates
and his essence or form discussed at the end ofMetaphysics Z.11 (1037b4–7)?
It seems clear that Socrates is non-identical with his essence. Indeed, this is
presupposed by our understanding of the non-identities in (1) and (9). But
is it also the case that he is not even coincidentally the same as his essence
in that the relation to his essence is “lesser” or “weaker” even than the re-
lation between Socrates and (e.g.) his cultivation (or between Socrates and
the cultivated Socrates)? Or does the end ofMetaphysics Z.11 entail only that
the relation between Socrates and his essence is not “simply” or “merely”, but
is more “exalted” and “stronger” than, the relation of coincidental sameness,
even if not as strong as the identity holding between an essence or form and
“its” essence, encapsulated in (2)? To this question our notions of essential
sameness and denition enable us to return a neat answer. e strength of
the relation between an item and its essence is stratied (whether in levels, or
types, or degrees is not important for present purposes).us, the strictest
or strongest relation, identity, obtains between an essence or form and “its”
essence.e weakest, coincidental sameness, applies to an object and an ac-
cidental compound consisting of this object plus a merely accidental feature
belonging to it (or between an object and its (having an) accidental feature).
ere is, however, tertium quid, a relation of intermediate strength: essen-
tial sameness and denition. is is the relation between Socrates and his
essence, being a human (or, for that matter, between the substance-kind hu-
man and its essence, being a human).
e second question is about the manner of involvement of extra (ma-
terial) items in Socrates, over and above those which may be essentially in-
volved in his (or his kind’s) essence or form. Obviously, any treatment of this
question ought to be sensitive to one’s attitude towards the previous ques-
tion. It seems, however, that Socrates’ own (non-essential) matter should
not be conceived as somehow essentially constituting Socrates. For, while
several (perhaps gradually even all) of the bits, tokens, or even (some) types
of matter or material part which Socrates possesses at some stage(s) of his
“career” could be lost with or without replacement (as the case may be), he
could persist as essentially the same (kind of) object. It is certainly true that
this last claim holds good on the assumption that Socrates’ essence is what
makes Socrates essentially a particular object of a specic type (or a specic
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type of particular object). e claim would have to be drastically qualied
(perhaps even dropped altogether) if we understood Socrates’ essence as
whatmakes Socrates essentially this concrete, particular, or token object, with
a synchronic and diachronic identity exclusive to him alone.
ird, what is the dierence between the extra types of matter had by
Socrates and the (material or formal) features making up his (or his kind’s)
essence?is question is clearly related to the second question just discussed
in the previous paragraph. But, while the second questionwas about theway
in which (non-essential) material items are involved in a particular com-
pound, this third question is about the nature of these material items them-
selves, and their dierence (if any) from the items included in the essence or
form being a human or being a rational soul. One could reply that the items
which are part of the essence or form being a human may be material in
some sense but are more generically specied than Socrates’ (non-essential)
matter. Or, to ll in some of the gaps inherent in this reply, an essence or
form may involve material features but always specied in a way which in-
vokes (for instance) formal, functional, or goal-directed characterisations.
us, for example, being a human or being a rational soul may (essentially)
include being bodily or being made up of tissues, esh, bones, etc. arranged
in a certain fashion. ese items, however, are never crudely material, as it
were, but are always characterised with the help of additional non-material
descriptions: for instance, being a body which is an instrument for realis-
ing a certain sort of rational life (a putative function or a telos). Alterna-
tively, one might argue that even if material items are present in an essence
or form, they are ultimately understood only or primarily in terms of their
formal, functional, or telic features. If so, they are somehow fully reducible to
non-material, form-related entities. By contrast, the (non-essential) matter
had by Socrates himself would be either concrete token-materials, or specic
types of perceptible matter/material part (or both): Socrates’ very own snub
nose; the snub type of nasal esh that he,eaetetus, and other snub-nosed
humans share, etc.
A further, more parsimonious, and perhaps more attractive, option
would be to understand denitions and essential sameness claims about So-
crates (such as (9) and (10)) analogously to corresponding claims about the
kind human (such as (1) and (4)). In this view, the items involved in Socrates’
essence—whether material or purely formal—are precisely those found in
the relevant kind’s essence or form. Socrates is essentially a member of the
kind human, and his essence is the essence of that kind: to be a human. In-
deed, given (2) and (3), to be a human for Socrates is to be a rational soul,
with whatever other essential features this essence or form encompasses—
whether material or/and formal.
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is suggestion could be set out using the device of the ‘the’ operator
deployed earlier. Despite the non-identity of Socrates and being a human,
codied in (9), the denition of Socrates as being a human (10) is correct,
and can be conservatively modied into:
(11) Socrates =de f the token-object whose essence is to be a human (or
to be a rational soul).
is straightforwardly entails the related identity claim:
(12) Socrates = the token-object whose essence is to be a human (or to
be a rational soul).
For how could Socrates not be identicalwith a relevant concrete token-object
that has the essence or form being a human? is view implies that par-
ticular compounds are essentially just members of their substance-kind or
instances of their essence or form. Moreover, just as in the case of the rele-
vant universal compound human, it does not require that the items involved
in Socrates’ essence (whether material or purely formal) are dramatically
dierent from what being a human (or being a rational soul) consists in.
Put simply, just as human is essentially a type-object that has the essence
or form being a human, similarly Socrates is essentially a token-object that
has the same essence, being a human. If so, both universal and particular
compounds are the same in essence or in nature as their essence or form,
even if not identical with it. is is also congenial to an understanding of
Aristotelian denition which is not constrained by the Procrustean identity
requirement. A denition such as (10) does not entail, nor is it equivalent to,
the identity ‘Socrates = being a human’. Hence, the deniens being a human
could be prior to the deniendum, Socrates. Moreover, this result vindicates
the claimmade towards the beginning of the present section that there is an
analogue of the non-identity stated in (1) which obtains in the case of par-
ticular compounds such as Socrates: our (9). While Socrates is dened in
terms of being a human, he is non-identical with but essentially the same as
this essence.
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